Possible arbitrary file write and read in Active Storage image analysis
Published: November 04, 2026
SECURITY IDENTIFIERS
- GHSA: GHSA-f3w6-w445-fwh9
- Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-f3w6-w445-fwh9
GEM
FRAMEWORK
SEVERITY
CVSS v3.x: 9.8 (Critical)
PATCHED VERSIONS
~> 8.0.5, >= 8.0.5.2
>= 8.1.4.1
DESCRIPTION
Impact
A Rails application that processes attachments with ImageMagick may allow an
unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the server and, when
attachments are stored with the Disk service, to read arbitrary files readable
by the application process. Those files typically include secret_key_base
and credentials for external systems, which may in turn allow escalation to
remote code execution or lateral movement to those systems.
Details
ImageMagick selects a coder from the content of the file it is given, and some
coders act on files named inside the image rather than on the image itself.
Active Storage constrained none of ImageMagick's coders, and the ImageMagick
analyzer runs when a file is attached, so an attacker who can upload a crafted
file may be able to invoke one. Attaching the upload is sufficient; no
variant, preview, or analyze call is required. One specific attack chain has
been reported to us, but we do not assume it is the only one that exists.
The fixed versions ship an ImageMagick security policy and prepend its
directory to MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH through MiniMagick.cli_env, so every
ImageMagick process that MiniMagick spawns applies it. The policy denies the
MSL scripting coder, the coders that read or delete files other than the
image, fetch remote or local references, or display to a screen, every coder
backed by Ghostscript together with the gs delegate, and @filename
indirection. ImageMagick applies every policy.xml on its search path, so the
shipped policy adds to the host's policy rather than replacing it. The policy
applies to every ImageMagick command that MiniMagick runs, not only those of
Active Storage. See the activestorage CHANGELOG and "ImageMagick Security
Policy" in the Active Storage guide.
Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Uses ImageMagick for Active Storage image processing. This is
config.active_storage.variant_processor = :mini_magick, which is the default for applications onload_defaults 6.1or earlier. - Runs ImageMagick under a security policy that does not already deny the coders involved. The policies that Debian and Ubuntu package do not.
- Allows file uploads from untrusted users.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a fixed version of
activestorage. - An application whose variant processor is
:mini_magickmust use mini_magick>= 5.1, which applying the policy requires. With an older mini_magick, such an application raises an exception during boot. - An application that renders PostScript or PDF through ImageMagick must
re-allow the
gsdelegate and the coders it uses in the host'spolicy.xml. - An application that replaces
MiniMagick.cli_envafter boot, clears the environment withMiniMagick.cli_prefix, or installs its ownMiniMagick::Shelldoes not receive the shipped policy and must carry its rules in ImageMagick's system policy. GraphicsMagick does not read ImageMagick policies. - If attachments are stored with the Disk service, change
secret_key_baseand every secret readable by the application process, including the master key and everythingconfig/credentials.yml.encholds, storage and database credentials, and third-party tokens. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.
Workarounds
Copy the rules of the policy that the fixed versions ship,
activestorage/lib/active_storage/image_magick/policy.xml, into ImageMagick's
system policy, for example /etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml. At a minimum, deny
the MSL coder, the Ghostscript coders, and the gs delegate:
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL"/>
<policy domain="delegate" rights="none" pattern="gs"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="{PS,PS2,PS3,EPS,EPS2,EPS3,EPI,EPSF,EPSI,EPT,EPT2,EPT3,PDF,AI,EPDF,PDFA,POCKETMOD,XPS,PCL}"/>
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/468aa9a93fc98f5476b6821770f4ccfcb7f7d328
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/ea8c40121ce53a3d0255cd4eb6d13bfe3bc01776
Versions affected
- activestorage < 8.0.5.2
- activestorage >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher ryotak.
References
- ImageMagick security policy
RELATED
- https://rubygems.org/gems/activestorage/versions/8.1.4.1
- https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1
- https://rubygems.org/gems/activestorage/versions/8.0.5.2
- https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2
- https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/468aa9a93fc98f5476b6821770f4ccfcb7f7d328
- https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/ea8c40121ce53a3d0255cd4eb6d13bfe3bc01776
- https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-f3w6-w445-fwh9
