Devise has an Open Redirect via Unvalidated `request.referrer` in Timeoutable Session Timeout Handler
Published: May 08, 2026
SECURITY IDENTIFIERS
- CVE: CVE-2026-40295 (NVD)
- GHSA: GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
- Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/security/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
GEM
SEVERITY
CVSS v3.x: 6.1 (Medium)
PATCHED VERSIONS
>= 5.0.4
DESCRIPTION
Summary
When the Timeoutable module is enabled in Devise, the
FailureApp#redirect_url method returns request.referrer — the
HTTP Referer header, which is attacker-controllable — without
validation for any non-GET request that results in a session timeout.
An attacker who hosts a page with an auto-submitting cross-origin
form can cause a victim with an expired Devise session to be
redirected to an arbitrary external URL. This contrasts with the
GET timeout path (which uses server-side attempted_path) and
Devise's own store_location_for mechanism (which strips external
hosts via extract_path_from_location), both of which are protected;
only the non-GET timeout redirect path is unprotected.
Details
The vulnerable code is in lib/devise/failure_app.rb:
def redirect_url
if warden_message == :timeout
flash[:timedout] = true if is_flashing_format?
path = if request.get?
attempted_path # safe: server-side value from warden options
else
request.referrer # UNSAFE: HTTP Referer header, attacker-controlled
end
path || scope_url
else
scope_url
end
end
This is passed directly to redirect_to:
def redirect
store_location!
# ...
redirect_to redirect_url # redirect_url may be an external attacker URL
end
The GET timeout path uses attempted_path, which is set server-side
by Warden and cannot be influenced by the client. The store_location!
method also only runs for GET requests, so no session-based protection
is applied on POST timeouts.
By contrast, Devise's store_location_for method (used elsewhere)
correctly sanitizes URLs via extract_path_from_location, which
strips the scheme and host.
Impact
- Victims with expired sessions who click any attacker-crafted link or visit an attacker page with an auto-submitting form are redirected to an arbitrary external URL.
- The redirect happens transparently via a trusted domain (the target app's domain), bypassing browser phishing warnings.
- An attacker can redirect victims to a fake login page to harvest credentials (phishing), or to malicious download sites.
Note: Rails' built-in open-redirect protection does not mitigate
this issue. Devise::FailureApp is an ActionController::Metal
app with its own isolated copy of the relevant redirect configuration,
so config.action_controller.action_on_open_redirect = :raise (and
the older raise_on_open_redirects setting) do not reach it.
Patches
This is patched in Devise v5.0.4. Users should upgrade as soon as possible.
Workaround
None beyond upgrading. If an upgrade is not immediately possible, the
same changes from the patch commit can be applied as a monkey-patch
in a Rails initializer (Devise::FailureApp#redirect_url and
Devise::Controllers::StoreLocation#extract_path_from_location).
Remove the monkey-patch after upgrading.
RELATED
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40295
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/releases/tag/v5.0.4
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/v5.0.4/CHANGELOG.md#504---2026-05-08
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/commit/9ea459de9aec5f1217ad738c58e0d23fb9f5beaa
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/commit/025fe2124f9928766fc46520e999633b598d0360
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/security/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
